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The transition from unfunded pensions may impose a "double burden" on a 
transitional generation, which must both pay taxes to finance current pension 
liabilities and save for their own retirement.  There are also economic gains which 
will accrue to future generations from increased rates of savings and capital 
accumulation.  In an economy with land, traded as an asset, increased productivity 
will raise current and future rents, causing capital gains in the price of land, which 
may be taxed to alleviate the income tax burden on the transitional generation.  For 
certain parameterizations, reform may be Pareto-improving. 
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1.   Introduction. 
The recent demographics of ageing populations have shaken the fiscal foundations of 
state pensions schemes which operate on a "pay-as-you-go" (PAYG) basis, 
transferring resources from those currently active in the labour market to those retired 
from it. Apart from the issue of sustainability, life-cycle theory predicts that PAYG 
schemes depress savings and capital accumulation through a consumption smoothing 
response.   This raises the question of pensions reform, which was first broached a 
quarter of a century ago by Feldstein (1975). 
 
There are clear long-term advantages to moving from public PAYG to private funded 
pensions.   Samuelson (1958) stated that the rate of return of PAYG is the same as the 
growth rate of the income tax base, which is equivalent to the underlying real growth 
rate.  This is empirically much lower then the long-run rate of return on equity.
3    
 
A problem of transition remains, because while there are clearly long-run gains from 
abandoning PAYG, there are unavoidable short-run transitional costs, which must be 
borne by a generation currently alive.  Assuming that existing pension liabilities are 
honoured, this transitional generation must bear a "double burden" by financing 
pension payments both for current retirees through their labour taxes and for 
themselves through their own private savings, since they cannot expect to be requited 
with public transfers in return.  The implication is that an existing PAYG pensions 
policy may be dynamically efficient in the sense that a reform would make at least 
one (transitional) generation worse-off.  
 
In principle the problem may be resolved if pensions reform brings additional side 
benefits, which can be used to compensate the transitional generation. A number of 
papers have considered the fact that PAYG pensions are financed by taxes which 
invariably have a distortionary effect on labour supply. Against the result in Breyer 
(1989) that no reform can be Pareto-improving where labour supply is fixed, 
subsequent papers by Homburg (1990), Breyer and Straub (1993) and Raffelhueschen 
(1993) have showed that an improvement is possible with an endogenous labour 
supply.  Demmel and Keuschnigg (2000) also show that a reform can also be Pareto-
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improving where employment is alternatively determined as the outcome of wage 
bargaining between firms and unions. 
 
A remaining problem is that while there may be significant side benefits, which are 
distributed over time, their current level may be insufficient to compensate the 
transitional generation.  This may call for an intergenerational redistribution policy to 
complement the reform by running a government debt.  Later generations would share 
some of the burden of honouring liabilities by paying higher taxes commensurate with 
the gains, which would arise over a longer horizon.  Government debt, of course, 
leads to the crowding out of capital investment where finite-lived agents do not have   
Becker-altruistic preferences within an operative bequest equilibrium as in Barro 
(1974).  
 
To summarise, a Pareto-improving reform may require two factors, additional side 
benefits to the reform and a complementary policy of intergenerational redistribution. 
In these two respects, the literature has focussed on the labour supply benefits from a 
reduction in distortionary taxation and on government debt as an intergenerational 
redistribution policy.  This present paper presents an alternative model where the side 
benefit comes through the factor of land instead of labour.   As land is an asset, the 
intergenerational distribution effect comes through the capitalization of future land 
rents in the current asset price.    
 
Land is both a factor of production, used along with capital and labour, and a store of 
value which is traded between the generations. The reform of PAYG pensions will 
lead to increased savings and capital accumulation.  The value of land rents, which is 
the marginal product of land, will then rise, if there are cross effects in the production 
function.  Land is also an asset which is priced as the present discounted value of all 
future rents.  A pensions reform will then cause capital gains in the price of land 
which may be taxed to reduce current level of labour taxation.   
 
The side benefit to the reform is the capital gain on land from the rise in present value 
of the future land rents.   An asset market for land with a capital gains tax substitutes 
for a government debt policy, since a forward-looking asset price brings forward the   4 
future gains of higher land rents into the present.  Thus, an extraordinary capital gains 
tax on land at the moment of reform can kill both of these birds with one stone.   
 
The paper is set up as follows.  In Section 2, a version of the Diamond (1965) model 
is presented.  The key feature is that young households save not only by holding 
deposits which are loaned to firms to raise physical capital but by buying land from 
old households. In Section 3 the model is solved in its steady-state.  Section 4 
considers the a PAYG reform enacted with a policy of taxing the extraordinary capital 
gains which arise from an unanticipated reform.  It is shown that the double burden 
problem can eliminated with the parameter values chosen.  Section 5 offers extends 
the discussion somewhat and Section 6 provides a brief summary.  
 
2.  The model. 
Households. 
There is a representative household which buys a consumption good in each period of 
a two-period lifetime. The rate of time preference is 0 £< ¥ q . It also supplies a 
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t c 1 +  are the consumption levels of a household which is young at time t 
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where 
Y
t x and 
O
t x 1 +  are the respective income levels at t and t+1. 
 
The income taxes of the young workers are paid to finance pay-as-you-go pensions 
payments,  t b , to those who are currently old.  There is no population growth and 
everyone lives for a full two periods, so the ratio of young to old is unity.  Where  t x  
is the disposable income paid out at time t, the PAYG pensions system is defined by 
the rule:    
t t
Y
t w t x ) 1 ( - = ,  1 1 1 + + + = t t
O
t w t x                         (3) 
   5 
There is no inheritance or bequest income.  Savings by individual i, 
i
t s , may be held 
in two assets, fixed price deposits, 
i
t a , and land, 
i
t q , which has the variable price,  t v . 
4 
In aggregate, savings are 
t t t t v q a s + =            
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0            (4) 
Land yields the rental income,  t z , and also a capital gain/loss where ,  t t v v ¹ +1 .  It is 
purchased by the young from the old, who have already received the current rent, and 
who then hold it for one period before they sell it to the next generation of young.  We 
allow for a possible capital gains tax on land at the rate,  1 + t t , where  0 1 > - + t t v v , 
which gives second-period asset income as: 
() ()
i
t t t t t t t
i
t t q v v v q z a r - - + + + + + + + + 1 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( t                         
t t q z 1 + is total rent payments per land holdings paid out at time t+1. 
 
All second period income is consumed, as there no bequests.  It comprises asset 
income plus potential income from a PAYG pension.
5  Using equation (4) and where  
0 1 > - + t t v v , second-period consumption is given by:  
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Maximization of (1) subject to (2)-(5) with respect to total savings, the "consumption-
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Equation (6) is the Euler equation which gives the time profile of individual 
consumption and equation (7) is the (risk-neutral) no arbitrage condition between the 
assets of land and deposits. 
 
                                                            
4 Generally, there may also be fixed price government debt which would accumulate at the same 
interest rate as deposits,  1 + t r . 
5  Savings would be affected by any unexpected element of the capital gain which is not taxed away.    6 
The land price per unit is solved from equation (7) as:   
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From the point of the household saver, land and deposits are perfect substitutes, but 
only deposits get channelled through by the financial intermediaries to firms which 
invest in physical capital.  Thus "investment" in land leads to the crowding-out of 
productive investment.  Assuming 100% depreciation, capital accumulation is equal 
to deposit savings: 
t t t t t
t
t t t t t t t t v q w m t
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Production.  
Each firm has a Cobb-Douglas production function and operates under constant 
internal returns to scale in three factors, land,  t q , capital, t k , and labour,  t l : 
b a b a
t t t t l k Aq y
- - =
1                                                                                                  (11) 
 
The profits equation: 
t t t t t t t t t t l w k r q z l k Aq - - - =
- - b a b a p
1                                           
is maximized with respect to two factors, land and capital:  
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There is a free-entry, zero profits condition: 
0 = t p                                 (14) 
Equations (12)-(14) determine the three factor demands.  The aggregate supply of 
land is assumed to be fixed.  Moreover, we also assume that there is no population   7 
growth, so that the aggregate supply labour is also exogenous.   This implies that there 
the will be no side effects on labour supply emanating from a change in either the 
level or  structure of taxation which would accompany pensions reform. 
 
Using the following normalizations, 
1 = = = m m l t t , 1 = = q qt                        (15) 
gives the following respective solutions for the rental value of land, the interest rate 
and the wage: 
a b a t t Ak z ) 1 ( - - =                                      (16) 
1 - =
a a t t Ak r                                        (17) 
a b t t Ak w =                                        (18) 
The convenient assumption of no population growth is made to obtain a steady-state 
solution for the level of capital alongside the two other assumptions of constant 
returns to scale in all factors and of a fixed aggregate supply of land.  The positive 
solution value for the interest rate and the steady-state solution for the level (not the 
growth rate of) the capital stock and, thus, the labour income base imply that the 
market rate of return exceeds the (zero) implicit rate of return on social security, so 
that reform is of undisputed long term benefit. 
 
Substituting the solutions for the wage and interest rate into (10) gives:  
t t t
t
t t t v k A t
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It is also apparent that increases in the price of land will lead to the crowding-out of 





                                                            
6  Furthermore,  the land price equation (7) admits bubbles which, in expectation, with a constant 
interest rate will  grow exponentially at the rate  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( t t r - - + .  The non-negativity of the capital 
stock requires that any positive land bubbles are short-lived.  We could use the same argument as in 
Diba and Grossman (1988) to rule out short-lived probabilistic bubbles.    8 
3.  The steady-state.  
Solution. 
Equations (7), (16) and (17) show that in the steady-state the price of land is given by: 











                     (20) 
It is shown later in the paper that the value of the parameter, f , the land-capital ratio, 
is important for the possibility of a Pareto-improving reform of PAYG pensions. 
 
Given that there will be no capital gains in the steady-state and that wages are 
constant, because of the convergence property from decreasing returns in the capital 
stock, budgetary balance requires constant labour income taxes,  i t t t + =   i " .  The 
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Only the positive rooted solution is considered to ensure both the non-negativity of 
the capital stock and plausible comparative static properties like an inverse 
relationship between the capital stock and the level of PAYG pensions. 
   
Simulated values. 
We assume the following parameter values:  66 . 0 = b ,  % 20 = t  and  2 = q .  The 
labour share parameter, b , is set at its generally assigned value; the tax/pension 
parameter, t, is initially set at a high level and the rate of time preference has been 
chosen to obtain an empirically plausible value for the interest rate,  0 r , of  082 . 3 .  
This  translates into an annualized rate of  % 10 . 4 , where a half-life is assumed to last 
50% of three-score years and ten.
7   
 
We consider the effect on the steady-state of abandoning PAYG social security by 
reducing the tax/pensions rate from 20% to zero.  The initial steady-state capital stock 
(where  % 20 = t ) is normalized at unity:  1 0 = k .  The new steady-state capital stock, 
                                                            
7  Over a thirty-five year half-life, () % 10 . 4 1 082 . 3 1
35 1 = - +    9 
k
~
, with zero taxes and expenditure on PAYG pensions,  0 = t , depends on the choice 
of the value for the  capital share, a , which, given the normalization,  1 0 = k , implies 
a value for total factor productivity,  A.  We try  25 . 0 = a  and find that  78 . 1
~
= k , 
roughly giving a three-quarters increase in the capital stock from the one steady-state 
to the other.  This magnitude of change is fairly robust to variations in the value of a , 
since if  20 . 0 = a ,   72 . 1
~
= k , while if  6 1 . 0  = a , 68 . 1
~
= k .  The new steady-state 
interest rate, r ~ , only depends on two parameters, b and q . As 
() b b q ) 1 )( 2 ( ~ - + = r , this is always equal to 2, which is at the annualized  rate of 
% 19 . 3 .
8   Thus, the reform of this PAYG pensions system with sizeable PAYG 
payments leads to a reduction in the annualized interest rate by almost a full 
percentage point.   
 
4.  A Pareto-improving reform? 
There are undisputed long-run benefits to reform since the implicit rate of return on 
PAYG in the  steady-state without population growth is zero while the rate of return 
on private savings is at the  positive rate of interest.  In addition reform will raise 
steady-state wages through increasing the capital stock. The question is, can the 
combination of PAYG reform and a complementary capital gains tax policy be 
Pareto-improving?  
 
We consider a reform from the starting position of the old steady-state where  % 20 = t  
and   1 0 = k .    The conditions for reform to be Pareto-improving are: 
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where  t b  is pension payments to retirees at time t. 
 
These conditions state that for each generation the level of wealth with the reform 
must be at least as great as it would have been without the reform - in the old steady-
state. 
                                                            
8 Over the same half-life, () % 19 . 3 1 2 1
35 1 = - +    10
  
Pensions benefit and tax specification of the reform: 
We make the following four assumptions, (A1)-(A4), to define a particular reform.  
These assumptions cover (i) the payment of existing pension liabilities, (ii) a labour 
income taxation policy, (iii) a capital gains taxation policy and (iv) a (no-) 
government debt policy. 
 
First, it is assumed that existing pension liabilities to the old who are currently alive 
are just honoured, so that condition (22) is satisfied as an equality, and that there are 
no further pensions payments: 
0 0w t bt = ,  0 = T b ,     1 + ³ " t T                                 (A1) 
Concerning labour taxation, the generation currently working at time t has to pay it 
the rate,  C t , without receiving a retirement pension.  All future generations neither 
pay labour income taxes not receive retirement pensions.  Labour income taxation 
policy is defined as: 
C t t t = ;  0 = T t ,       1 + ³ " t T                       (A2) 
 
We also assume that capital gains on land at the time of the reform are taxed at the 
rate  % 100 and that, thereafter, there are no capital gains taxes: 
1 = t t ;   0 = T t ,     1 + ³ " t T                       (A3) 
Note that the 100% capital gains tax at time t does not only ensure maximum revenue 
from this source; it also ensures that there is no revision of household saving 
emanating from the unanticipated capital gain, as all of this is taxed away. 
 
Finally, the labour income tax at time t,  C t , is set such that there is no government 
deficit at time t: 
0 ) ( 0 0 0 0 = - - - v v w t w t t C                         (A4) 
There are no later government deficits by the assumptions (A1)-(A4).  As there is no 
initial government debt, the zero deficit assumption implies that there is no 
subsequent government debt. 
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Solution.  
Assumptions (A2)-(A4) imply that capital accumulation over t, t+1: 
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and beyond that: 
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It is necessary to solve the price of land during the transition to the new steady-state.  
The model is too nonlinear for an explicit solution, so we use the following 
approximation: 
T T T r r r R ) 1 ( 1
1 - + » + º ,  T "                        (27) 
This allows a solution for the transitional dynamics of the form, 
a
T T Gk k = +1                              (28) 
where G  can be determined as a constant within the approximation used in equation 
(27). 
 
The undetermined coefficient solution method is now used to solve G .  Equations 
(26)-(28) imply: 
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which is substituted into the balanced budget assumption (A4) to give: 
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This can be rearranged in terms of the current tax rate: 
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Equation (32) pins down the current labour income tax rate that satisfies the 
government budget equation, given the above assumptions, (A1)-(A4), on pension 
payments, labour taxes, capital gains taxes and debt/deficit policy. 
 
Assumption (A1) and the fact that the wage at time t is predetermined with the capital 
stock,  0 w wt = , together imply that the condition for the Pareto-improvement in (23) 
requires that at time t:  
0 0 0
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Assumption (A2) and condition (23) imply that, thereafter, the following condition is 
required:  
T w w t
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Condition (33) states that the transitional generation is not made worse-off.  This is 
also necessary for condition (34) that no subsequent generation is made worse-off, 
which requires only that the capital stock never falls below its initial value,  0 k kT ³ , 
T t £ +1 .  A higher utility level for the transitional generation requires they have a 
higher level of disposable income, which leads to higher savings and capital 
accumulation for all subsequent generations. 
 
In particular, we show that condition (34) where  T t = +1 depends on condition (33).  
The requirement here is that  0 1 k kt > + . Capital accumulation equation (10) where the 
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Condition (33) implies that the right-hand-side is positive and, thus,  0 1 k kt > + .   
 
There should be no subsequently drop in the capital stock, because no generation from 
t+1 onwards will pay labour income taxes.  This implies that subsequent levels of 
households savings will be even higher.  Furthermore, there will be no rise in the land 
price which is so high as to reverse the beneficial effect of savings on capital 
accumulation, since the price of land will already have discounted most of the future 
capital accumulation effects at time t.  This allows us to focus exclusively on 
condition (33) as the condition for a Pareto-improving reform. 
 
Simulated values. 
We return to the values chosen in the previous section.  An initial steady-state with an  
interest rate of 3.082, annualized to 4.10%, and a tax rate of 20% imply that the 
critical value for the new tax rate,  C t , is 15.1% from equation (34).  If this is at least 
as great as the tax rate which will balance the budget in equation (32), then the reform 
is Pareto-improving. 
   14
We consider three different values of a  and, by implication, three values for the 
steady-state land-capital ratio, f , for a given labour share, b , at  6 . 0 ￿ .   
(i) The first case is where 25 . 0 = a , so that 3 . 0 ￿ = f .  Substituting these values into 
equation (32) shows that the labour income tax rate which balances the budget is 18%, 
which would make the current generation worse-off (as 18%>15.1%).  (ii) Trying the 
case  20 . 0 = a , so  6 . 0 ￿ = f , reduces the budget balancing tax rate to 16%, but the 
policy is still not Pareto-improving (as 16%>15.1%).  (iii)  Finally, the value 
6 1 . 0 ￿ = a , so  1 = f , is more than sufficient because the budget balancing tax rate falls 
to 13.2% (as 13.2%<15.1%).   
 
Small values of a  are required because they imply large values of f , the steady-state 
land price/capital ratio.  Reform will be Pareto-improving if the capital gain is 
sufficiently large, which requires the steady-state ratio of the value of land to capital is 
sufficiently high.  
 
5.  Further considerations. 
It has been shown, in principle at least, that broadening the basic overlapping 
generations model to include land may, with a capital gains tax on land prices, solve 
the transition problem of reforming  PAYG pensions system.  Arguably, the capital 
gains effect may in practise be too small to bring about a Pareto-improving reform.  
Although there may be little doubt about this, we suggest that the effect of capital 
gains on land may be of some worth in complementing the labour supply effects, 
which are more often considered. 
 
In fact, as well as an additional effect from capital gains there may also be a useful 
synergy working between the capital gain and the labour supply effects.  In a broader 
model embracing an endogenous labour supply, the increase in employment through a 
reduction in distortionary taxation may cause even larger capital gains through a cross 
effect between land and labour in the production function.  Secondly, the replacement 
of distortionary taxes on labour by non-distortionary taxes on capital gains will lead to 
an even greater labour supply response.       
   15
We have introduced a forward-looking asset price as a means of bringing forward the 
long-run future gains to the transitional generation currently alive.  One possibility 
would be to consider alternative forms of asset.  There is a problem, however, with 
the most likely candidate of equity capital, because the equity price of the marginal 
firm will always equal an undetermined entry cost.
9  In the basic and standard case of 
zero entry costs, land alone is the factor earning a "rent" and the only asset generating 
taxable capital gains.  Prospective capital gains to capital would immediately be 
consumed by new entry, although there may be other external benefits in an increase 
in the number of firms.   
 
We have considered the case where reform comes as a complete surprize, so that there 
is a single unanticipated transition from a pre-reform tax rate of  0 > =t tT , 
1 + ³ " t T , to a post-reform tax rate of  0 = T t ,  1 + ³ " t T .  If there are prior beliefs 
of reform but with uncertainty, the price of land will depend on the probability 
distribution of each  T t ,  1 + ³ " t T .  Prior to the reform, the first moments of the 
distributions will generally satisfy  t t £ £ ) ( 0 T E ,  1 + ³ " t T , instead of  t t = ) ( T E , 
1 + ³ " t T .  The effect of uncertainty on these first-moments will be to reduce the 
value of the post-reform capital gain.   
 
There is some ambiguity in the overall effects of uncertainty, because with uncertainty 
the higher moments of the  T t -distributions may have an increasing effect on the 
capital gain.  The effect of uncertainty in raising precautionary savings may raise the 
price of land through increased capital accumulation.   Furthermore, land becomes a 
risky-asset and one with a price which is negatively correlated with PAYG pensions 
payments.  This suggests that the demand for land may rise through the a portfolio 
effect intended to reduce the overall variance on second-period income, which 
comprises the return on deposits, the total return on land and PAYG pensions. 
 
Uncertainty muddies the waters also because there may in fact be two transitions.  The 
first is from an initial pre-reform state where reform is not even contemplated to an 
intermediate state where reform is probabilistic.  The second is from this intermediate 
                                                            
9  This is with perfect financial market where the prospective firm can borrow against future profits at a   16
probabilistic state to a final state where reform is actually enacted.  The analysis of 
this paper has condensed these two transitions into one, eliminating the intermediate 
state. 
 
6.  Concluding comments. 
A model has been presented where land is both a fixed factor of production in 
aggregate and an asset which is traded between the generations for its store of value 
property.  As usual, a reform of state-run PAYG pensions will raise savings and 
capital accumulation.  This in turn increases land rents, because of cross effects in the 
production function.  The asset price of land then rises as it is determined as the 
present discounted value of all future land rents.  An unanticipated pensions reform 
will lead to immediate capital gains which may then be taxed to reduce the level of 
current labour taxation in order to compensate the transitional generation.   
 
It is important to highlight the fact that labour supply is fixed in this model.  As such, 
it is unaffected by changes in either the level or the structure of taxation.  It is rather 
the feature that land, which yields an economic rent, is held as an asset which is the 
driving force behind the model.   Pensions reform causes (financial) capital gains on 
land from the standard (physical) capital accumulation effect and cross-effects in the 
production function.  These gains may be taxed (in any way) to reduce taxes (of any 
kind) on labour income.  We have assumed proportional taxes on labour income for 
plausibility and a once-off 100% tax on capital gains for analytical tractability. 
  
In principle, for certain parameterizations, the tax revenue collected from the 
extraordinary capital gains may be sufficiently high to facilitate a Pareto-improving 
reform.  In practise, it is probably more realistic to believe that the capital gains tax 
effect would be less generous.  At worse, the effect would augment and reinforce the 
studied labour supply responses, thus tipping the balance further in favour of the 




                                                                                                                                                                      
common market rate of interest.   17
References. 
Barro, R. (1974), "Are government bonds net wealth?", Journal of Political Economy, 
82,  1095-1118. 
Breyer, F. (1989), "On the intergenerational Pareto efficiency of pay-as-you-go 
finance pension systems", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical economics, 
145, 643-658. 
Breyer, F. and Straub, M. (1993), "Welfare Effects of Unfunded Pensions Systems 
when labor supply is endogenous." Journal of Public Economics, 50, 77-91. 
Demmel, R. and Keuschnigg, C. (2000) "Funded Pensions and Unemployment", 
Finanzarchiv 57, 22-38. 
Diamond, P. A. (1965) “National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model.” American 
Economic Review 55, 1126-50.  
Diba, B.T. and Grossman, H.I. (1988), "The theory of rational bubbles in stock 
prices",  The Economic Journal, 98, 746-754. 
Feldstein, M. (1975), Toward a reform of social security, Public Interest, 40, 75-95. 
Feldstein, M. (1998), "Introduction" in Privatizing Social Security, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, Chicago. 
Homburg, S. (1990), "The Efficiency of Unfunded Pension Schemes", Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146. 640-647. 
Raffelhueschen, B. (1993), "Funding Social Security through Pareto-optimal 
Conversion Policies", Journal of Economics 7, Supplement ,105-131.  
Samuelson, P. (1958), "An exact consumption-loan of interest with or without the 
social contrivance of money", Journal of Political Economy, 66,  467-482. 
 
  Titles published in EPRU's Working Paper Series, beginning in November 1993:
2001
01-01 Henrik Jensen: Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking
01-02 Thorvaldur Gylfason and Gylfi Zoega: Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The
Role of Investment.
01-03 Wilhelm Kohler: International Fragmentation of Value-added Chains: How Does it
Affect Domestic Factor Prices?
01-04 Mark A. Roberts and Eric O’N. Fisher: Funded Pensions, Labor Market Participation,
and Economic Growth.
01-05 Søren Bo Nielsen, Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Guttorm Schjelderup: Formula
Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition.
01-06 Christian Keuschnigg and Søren Bo Nielsen: Public Policy for Venture Capital.
01-07 Søren Bo Nielsen, Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, and Guttorm Schjelderup: Tax Spillovers
under Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment
01-08 Peter Birch Sørensen: International Tax Coordination: Regionalism versus Globalism.
01-09 Michael M. Hutchison: A Cure Worse Than the Desease? Currency Crises and the
Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs.
01-10 Rasmus Lenz and Torben Tranæs: Job Search and Savings: Wealth Effects and Duration
Dependence.
01-11 Dieter Bös: Bureaucrats and Public Procurement.
01-12 Kala Krishna and Cemile Yavas: Wage Equality in a General Equilibrium Model with
Indivisibilities.
01-13 Mark A. Roberts: Funding the Transition from Pay-As-You-Go Pensions by Taxing
Capital Gains on Land.
2000
00-01 Andrew Hughes Hallett and Maria Demertzis: When Can An Independent Central Bank
Offer Lower Inflation at No Cost? A Political Economy Analysis.
00-02 Torben M. Andersen: International Integration, Risk and the Welfare State.
00-03 F. Gulzin Ozkan, Anne Sibert and Alan Sutherland: Monetary Union, Entry Conditions
and Economic Reform.00-04 Michael M. Hutchison: European Banking Distress and EMU: Institutional and
Macroeconomic Risks.
00-05 Bertil Holmlund: Labor Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production.
00-06 Knud Jørgen Munk: Administrative Costs and the “Double Dividend”.
00-07 Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Claus Thustrup Hansen: Scale-Invariant Endogenous Growth.
00-08 A. Lans Bovenberg and Ben J. Heijdra: Environmental Abatement and Intergenerational
Distribution.
00-09 Jan Overgaard Olesen: A Simple Explanation of Stock Price Behaviour in the Long Run:
Evidence for Denmark.
00-10 John E. Roemer, Rolf Aaberge, Ugo Colombino, Johan Fritzell, Stephen P. Jenkins, Ive
Marx, Marianne Page, Evert Pommer, Javier Ruiz-Castillo, Maria Jesus San Segundo,
Torben Tranæs, Gert G. Wagner, and Ignacio Zubiri: To What Extent Do Fiscal Regimes
Equalize Opportunities for Income Acquisition among Citizens?
00-11 Christian Schultz and Tomas Sjöström: Local Public Goods, Debt and Migration.
00-12 Francesco Daveri: Is Growth an Information Technology Story in Europe Too?
00-13 Peter F. Christoffersen: Dating the Turning Points of Nordic Business Cycles.
00-14 Reuven Glick and Michael M. Hutchison: Stopping “Hot Money” or Signalling Bad
Policy? Capital Controls and the Onset of Currency Crises.
00-15 Dan Anderberg and Carlo Perroni: Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule.
00-16 Henrik Jacobsen Kleven: Optimum Taxation and the Allocation of Time.
00-17 Clemens Fuest, Bernd Huber and Søren Bo Nielsen: Why Is the Corporate Tax Rate
Lower than the Personal Tax Rate?
00-18 Christian Keuschnigg and Søren Bo Nielsen: Tax Policy, Venture Capital, and
Entrepreneurship.
00-19 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: Withholding Taxes or Information Exchange:
The Taxation of International Interest Flows.
00-20 David Dreyer Lassen: Political Accountability and the Size of Government: Theory and
Cross-Country Evidence.
1999
99-01 Henrik Jacobsen and Peter Birch Sørensen: Labour Tax Reform, The Good Jobs and the
Bad Jobs.99-02 Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin and Christian Schultz: Divide the Dollar, A Model of Interregional
Redistributive Politics.
99-03 Pekka Ilmakunnas, Vesa Kanniainen, and Uki Lammi: Entrepreneurship, Economic
Risks, and Risk-Insurance in the Welfare State.
99-04 Niels Thygesen: Evolving Ambitions in Europe’s Monetary Unification.
99-05 Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller: Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid
Allocation.
99-06 Roel M.W.J. Beetsma and Henrik Jensen: Structural Convergence under Reversible and
Irreversible Monetary Unification.
99-07 Wolfgang Mayer and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller: The Politics of Foreign Aid.
99-08 Dermot Leahy and Catia Montagna: Temporary Social Dumping, Union Legalisation
and FDI: A Note on the Strategic Use of Standards.
99-09 Rasmus Fatum and Michael M. Hutchison: Is Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention
Effective After All? An Event Study Approach.
99-10 Christian Schultz and Tomas Sjöström: Public Debt, Property Values and Migration.
99-11 Roel M.W.J. Beetsma and Henrik Jensen: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard with a
Stability Pact.
99-12 Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Wolfram F. Richter and Peter Birch Sørensen: Optimal
Taxation with Household Production.
99-13 Huw Dixon, Claus Thustrup Hansen and Henrik Jacobsen Kleven: Dual Labour Markets
and Menu Costs: Explaining the Cyclicality of Productivity and Wage Differentials.
99-14 Jim Malley and Hassan Molana: Fiscal Policy and the Composition of Private
Consumption: Some Evidence from the U.S. and Canada.
99-15 Jonas Agell and Per Lundborg: Survey Evidence on Wage Rigidity and Unemployment:
Sweden in the 1990s.
99-16 Satya P. Das: North-South Trade, Capital Accumulation and Personal Distribution of
Wealth and Income.
99-17 Holger Bonin, Bernd Raffelhüschen and Jan Walliser: Can Immigration Alleviate the
Demographic Burden?
99-18 Morten Hvidt and Søren Bo Nielsen: Noncooperative vs. Minimum-Rate Commodity
Taxation.99-19 Lisandro Abrego and Carlo Perroni: Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent
Environmental Policy.
99-20 Reuven Glick and Michael M. Hutchison: Banking and Currency Crises: How Common
Are Twins?
99-21 Mark Gradstein and Moshe Justman: Public Schooling, Social Capital and Growth.
99-22 Jeremy S.S. Edwards and Alfons J. Weichenrieder: Ownership Concentration and Share
Valuation: Evidence from Germany.
99-23 Henrik Jensen: Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?
99-24 Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and Thomas F. Rutherford: Distributional Effects of Fiscal
Consolidation.
1998
98-01 Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Kimberley A. Scharf: The Optimal Design of Transfer
Pricing Rules: A Non-Cooperative Analysis.
98-02 Michael Keen, Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller: When Is Policy
Harmonisation Desirable?
98-03 Clemens Fuest and Bernd Huber: Tax Progression and Human Capital in Imperfect
Labour Markets.
98-04 Frank Hettich and Minna Selene Svane: Environmental Policy in a Two Sector
Endogenous Growth Model.
98-05 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: Is Coordination of Fiscal Deficits Necessary?
98-06 Claus Thustrup Hansen: A Note on Blanchard & Kiyotaki (1987).
98-07 Claus Thustrup Hansen: Long Run Impact of Increased Wage Pressure.
98-08 Erkki Koskela and Ronnie Schöb: Why Governments Should Tax Mobile Capital in the
Presence of Unemployment.
98-09 Mark A. Roberts: Unfunded Social Security in the OLG Model with an Imperfectly
Competitive Finance Market.
98-10 Peter Birch Sørensen: Tax Policy, the Good Jobs and the Bad Jobs.
98-11 Roel M.W.J. Beetsma and Henrik Jensen: Optimal Inflation Targets, “Conservative”
Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment.98-12 Ole Risager: Random Walk or Mean Reversion: The Danish Stock Market Since World
War I.
98-13 João Ejarque and Torben Tranæs: Skill-Neutral Shocks and Institutional Changes:
Implications for Productivity Growth and Wage Dispersion.
98-14 Minna Selene Svane: Growth, Training Leave and Unemployment.
98-15 Svend E. Hougaard Jensen: Nominal Stability, Real Convergence, and Fiscal Transfers
in a Monetary Union.
98-16 U. Michael Bergman and Michael Hutchison: The Costs of EMU and Economic
Convergence.
98-17 Niels Thygesen: Fiscal Institutions in EMU and the Stability Pact.
98-18 Søren Bo Nielsen: A Simple Model of Commodity Taxation and Cross-Border Shopping.
98-19 Christian Schultz: Monetary Policy, Delegation and Polarization.
98-20 Knud Jørgen Munk: Should Governments Create Production Inefficiency?
98-21 Syed M. Ahsan and Panagiotis Tsigaris: The Public Discount Rate and the Uncertain
Budgetary Flows.
98-22 Minna Selene Svane: Emission Standards and Growth.
1997
97-01 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: The Political Economy of Capital Income and
Profit Taxation in a Small Open Economy.
97-02 Torsten Sløk and Jens Peter Sørensen: How Small Shocks and Heterogeneous
Expectations Can Create Swings in the Exchange Rate.
97-03 Thórarinn G. Pétursson and Torsten Sløk: Wage Formation in a Cointegrated VAR
Model: A Demand and Supply Approach.
97-04 Jeffrey H. Nilsen: Borrowed Reserves, Fed Funds Rate Targets, and the Term Structure.
97-05 Carlo Perroni and Kimberley A. Scharf: Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition
and Constitutional Choices.
97-06 Sajal Lahiri, Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, Kar-yiu Wong, and Alan D. Woodland:
Optimal Income Transfers and Tariffs.
97-07 Claus Thustrup Hansen and Hans Jørgen Jacobsen: Rebalancing Unemployment Benefits
in a Unionized Labour Market.97-08 Sören Blomquist and Vidar Christiansen: Price Subsidies versus Public Provision.
97-09 Amrita Dhillon, Carlo Perroni and Kimberley A. Scharf: Implementing Tax
Coordination.
97-10 Peter Birch Sørensen: Optimal Tax Progressivity in Imperfect Labour Markets.
97-11 Syed M. Ahsan and Peter Tsigaris: The Design of a Consumption Tax under Capital
Risk.
97-12 Claus Thustrup Hansen and Søren Kyhl: Pay-per-view Television: Consequences of a
Ban.
97-13 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: The Taxation of Interest in Europe: A Minimum
Withholding Tax?
97-14 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: A Welfare Comparison of International Tax
Regimes with Cross-Ownership of Firms.
97-15 Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Alan D. Woodland: Tariff Strategies and Small Open
Economies.
97-16 Ritva Tarkiainen and Matti Tuomala: On Optimal Income Taxation with Heterogenous
Work Preferences.
97-17 Minna Selene Svane: Optimal Taxation in a Two Sector Model of Endogenous Growth.
97-18 Frank Hettich: Growth Effects of a Revenue Neutral Environmental Tax Reform.
97-19 Erling Steigum, Jr.: Fiscal Deficits, Asset Prices and Intergenerational Distribution in
an Open Unionized Economy.
97-20 Rod Falvey and Geoff Reed: Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments.
97-21 U. Michael Bergman, Michael M. Hutchison and Yin-Wong Cheung: Should the Nordic
Countries Join A European Monetary Union? An Empirical Analysis.
97-22 Kenneth M. Kletzer: Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency: Does
European Monetary Unification Create a Need for Fiscal Insurance or Federalism?
97-23 Martin Richardson: Trade Policy and Access to Retail Distribution.
97-24 Sugata Marjit and Hamid Beladi: Protection, Underemployment and Welfare.
97-25 Bernd Huber: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in an Optimum Income Tax
Model.
97-26 Clemens Fuest and Bernd Huber: Tax Coordination and Unemployment.97-27 Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa Yuen: Quantitative Implications of the Home
Bias: Foreign Underinvestment, Domestic Oversaving, and Corrective Taxation.
97-28 Mark A. Roberts, Karsten Stæhr, and Torben Tranæs: Two-Stage Bargaining with
Coverage Extension in a Dual Labour Market.
1996
96-01 Torben Tranæs: A Simple Model of Raiding Opportunities and Unemployment.
96-02 Kala Krishna and Ling Hui Tan: Transferable Licenses vs. Nontransferable Licenses:
What is the Difference?
96-03 Jiandong Ju and Kala Krishna: Market Access and Welfare Effects of Free Trade. Areas
without Rules of Origin.
96-04 Anders Sørensen: Growth Enhancing Policies in a Small Open Economy.
96-05 Anders Sørensen: Industrialization and Factor Accumulation.
96-06 Christian Schultz: Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy.
96-07 Christian Schultz: Political Competition and Polarization.
96-08 Ole Risager and William G. Tyler: Macroeconomic Policy and Exchange Rate Policy
Management in a Small Dependent Economy: Estimating the Effects of Currency
Devaluation in Jordan.
96-09 Neil Rankin: How Does Uncertainty About Future Fiscal Policy Affect Current
Macroeconomic Variables?
96-10 U. Michael Bergman and Michael M. Hutchison: The ￿German View’, Fiscal
Consolidation and Consumption Booms: Empirical Evidence from Denmark.
96-11 Eric Hansen and Michael M. Hutchison: Exchange Rates, Non-traded Goods and the
Terms-of-Trade: An Empirical Application for New Zealand.
96-12 Michael M. Hutchison and Carl E. Walsh: Central Bank Institutional Design and the
Output Cost of Disinflation: Did the 1989 New Zealand Reserve Bank Act Affect the
Inflation-Output Tradeoff?
96-13 Rasmus Fatum and Michael M. Hutchison: Is Intervention a Signal of Future Monetary
Policy? Evidence from the Federal Funds Futures Market.
96-14 Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson and Anders Sørensen: Policy Rules for Exploitation of
Renewable Resources: A Macroeconomic Perspective.
96-15 Anders Sørensen: International Welfare Effects from Country-Specific R&D Subsidies.
96-16 Andreas Haufler and Søren Bo Nielsen: Dynamic Effects of an Anticipated Switch from
Destination- to Origin-Based Commodity Taxation.96-17 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: The Coordination of Capital Income and Profit
Taxation with Cross-Ownership of Firms.
96-18 Svend Erik Hougaard Jensen: Wage Rigidity, Monetary Integration and Fiscal
Stabilisation in Europe.
96-19 Ole Risager and Jan Rose Sørensen: Job Security Policies and Trade Union Behaviour
in an Open Economy.
96-20 Slobodan Djajic, Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller: Transfer and the
Intertemporal Terms of Trade.
96-21 Slobodan Djajic, Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller: Logic of Aid in an
Intertemporal Setting.
96-22 Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and Bernd Raffelhüschen: Public Debt, Welfare Reforms, and
Intergenerational Distribution of Tax Burdens in Denmark.
1995
95-01 Vesa Kanniainen and Jan Södersten: On Financial Adjustment and Investment Booms:
Lessons from Tax Reforms.
95-02 Søren Bo Nielsen: Withholding Taxes and Country-Specific Shocks.
95-03 Vesa Kanniainen and Rune Stenbacka: Towards a Theory of Socially Valuable Imitation
with Implications for Technology Policy.
95-04 Bent E. Sørensen, Pierfederico Asdrubali, and Oved Yosha: Channels of Interstate
Risksharing: US 1963-1990.
95-05 Peter Birch Sørensen: Changing Views of the Corporate Income Tax.
95-06 Robin Boadway: The Role of Second-Best Theory in Public Economics.
95-07 Sjak Smulders: Environmental Policy and Sustainable Economic Growth - an
endogenous growth perspective.
95-08 Bernd Genser: Patterns of Tax Arbitrage and Decentralized Tax Autonomy.
95-09 Harry Huizinga and Søren Bo Nielsen: Capital Income and Profits Taxation with
Foreign Ownership of Firms.
95-10 Ben Lockwood: Commodity Tax Harmonisation with Public Goods - an Alternative
Perspective.
95-11 Saqib Jafarey, Yannis Kaskarelis, and Apostolis Philippopoulos: Private Investment and
Endogenous Fiscal Policy. Theory and Evidence from UK and USA.
95-12 Svend Erik Hougaard Jensen: Debt Reduction, Wage Formation and Intergenerational
Welfare.
95-13 Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos: Public Good Provision and the Welfare Effects of
Indirect Tax Harmonisation.95-14 Ruud A. de Mooij and A. Lans Bovenberg: Environmental Taxes, International Capital
Mobility and Inefficient Tax Systems: Tax Burden vs. Tax Shifting.
95-15 David F. Bradford: Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues.
95-16 Ole Risager: On the Effects of Trade Policy Reform: The Case of Jordan.
95-17 Niels Thygesen: The Prospects for EMU by 1999 - and Reflections on Arrangements for
the Outsiders.
95-18 Christian Keuschnigg and Søren Bo Nielsen: Housing Markets and Vacant Land.
95-19 Hans Fehr: Welfare Effects of Investment Incentive Policies: A Quantitative Assessment.
95-20 Ben Lockwood, Torsten Sløk, and Torben Tranæs: Progressive Taxation and Wage
Setting: Some Evidence for Denmark.
95-21 Claus Thustrup Hansen, Lars Haagen Pedersen, and Torsten Sløk: Progressive Taxation,
Wages and Activity in a Small Open Economy.
95-22 Svend Erik Hougaard Jensen and Bernd Raffelhüschen: Intertemporal Aspects of Fiscal
Policy in Denmark.
1994
94-01 Niels Thygesen: Reinforcing Stage Two in the EMU Process.
94-02 Kåre P. Hagen and Vesa Kanniainen: Optimal Taxation of Intangible Capital.
94-03 Ed W.M.T. Westerhout: The Economic and Welfare Effects of Taxing Foreign Assets.
94-04 Slobodan Djajic: Illegal Immigration and Resource Allocation.
94-05 Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos: Is There Anything Wrong with Tied-Aid?
94-06 Ben Lockwood, Apostolis Philippopoulos, and Andy Snell: Fiscal Policy, Public Debt
Stabilzation and Politics: Theory and evidence from the US and UK.
94-07 Partha Sen: Welfare-Improving Debt Policy under Monopolistic Competition.
94-08 Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos: Tying of Aid to Trade Policy Reform and Welfare.
94-09 Mark Gradstein and Moshe Justman: Public Choice of an Education System and its
Implications for Growth and Income Distribution.
94-10 Peter Birch Sørensen, Lars Haagen Pedersen, and Søren Bo Nielsen: Taxation, Pollution,
Unemployment and Growth: Could there be a "Triple Dividend" from a Green Tax
Reform?
94-11 Peter Birch Sørensen and Søren Bo Nielsen: On the Optimality of the Nordic System of
Dual Income Taxation.94-12 Sajal Lahiri and Pascalis Raimondos: Competition for Aid and Trade Policy.
94-13 Niels Kleis Frederiksen, Peter Reinhard Hansen, Henrik Jacobsen, and Peter Birch
Sørensen: Comsumer Services, Employment and the Informal Economy.
94-14 Yoshiyasu Ono: Market Segmentation and Effective Demand Shortage in a World with
Dynamic Optimization.
1993
93-01 Svend Erik Hougaard Jensen, Søren Bo Nielsen, Lars Haagen Petersen and Peter Birch
Sørensen:  Tax Reform, Welfare, and Intergenerational Redistribution - An
Intertemporal Simulation Approach.
93-02 Bernd Genser, Andreas Haufler and Peter Birch Sørensen: Indirect Taxation in an
Integrated Europe. Is there a Way of Avoiding Trade Distortions Without Sacrificing
National Tax Autonomy?
93-03 Svend Erik Hougaard Jensen and Lars Grue Jensen: Debt, Deficits and Transition to
EMU: A Small Country Analysis.
93-04 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini: Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing
and Moral Hazard.
93-05 Martin Paldam: The Political Economy of Stopping High Inflation.
93-06 Roger H. Gordon and Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason: Why is There Corporate Taxation in
a Small Open Economy? The Role of Transfer Pricing and Income Shifting.
93-07 Peter Birch Sørensen: From the Global Income Tax To the Dual Income Tax: Recent
Tax Reforms in The Nordic Countries.
93-08 Wilhelm Kohler: Strategic Trade Policy and Integration.
93-09 F. Gulcin Ozkan and Alan Sutherland: A Model of the ERM Crisis.